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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 07-4525
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DARREN SMITH
also known as DOMINIQUE EVANS
also known as DARREN SMITH
Darren Smith,
                            Appellant
             
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-07-cr-00376-001)
District Judge: Hon. Stanley R. Chesler
             
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 21, 2009
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Filed    April 23, 2009 )
             
        
OPINION




Darren Smith, who pled guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery and conspiracy to
commit burglary, appeals his sentence of 188 months incarceration.  We will affirm.
I.
Smith conspired with others to commit at least fifty-five home-invasion robberies
as well as the armed robbery of a jewelry store.  In committing the home invasions, Smith
and his co-defendants cut telephone and home alarm wires, forcibly pushed in the front
doors, and stole items that they later illegally sold.  With respect to the jewelry store
robbery, Smith gave a semi-automatic pistol to his co-defendant Williams and threatened
to hurt Williams’ mother, daughter, and girlfriend if he did not rob the store.
Smith pled guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1951(a) and conspiracy to commit burglary in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  In the plea
agreement, the parties stipulated that Smith’s total offense level was twenty-nine and his
criminal category was VI,  that a sentence “within the Guidelines range that results from1
the agreed total Guidelines offense level of 29 (twenty-nine) is reasonable,” and that the
parties would not seek an upward or downward departure or adjustment.  App. at 32.  In
addition, the plea agreement included an appellate waiver, providing that Smith
“voluntarily waives, the right to file any appeal . . . which challenges the sentence imposed
3. . . if that sentence falls within or below the Guidelines range that results from the agreed
total Guidelines offense level of 29.”  App. 32.  Smith reserved his right to appeal the
court’s determination of his criminal history category, but “if the sentencing court accepts
a stipulation [herein], both parties waive the right to file an appeal . . . claiming that the
sentencing court erred in doing so.”  App. at 32.
At the plea colloquy, the District Court questioned Smith about his stipulations in
order to ensure that he understood their effect on his sentence:
THE COURT: [The plea agreement] contains some agreements between you
and the U.S. Attorney’s office about . . . facts which go into calculating . . .
the guideline sentencing range . . . [. F]or example, you have agreed . . . that
your total offense level in this case is a level 29.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You’ve also agreed . . . that your criminal history category is
a level six.
App. at 50.  In addition, the District Court addressed Smith’s appellate waiver:
THE COURT: [The plea agreement provides that, i]f I give you a sentence
which is within the sentencing range for an offense level 29 or lower, you
will not appeal the sentence or the conviction or make any other type of post-
conviction attack or challenge on the sentence or conviction.  Have you in
fact agreed to do that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Have you discussed it with [your attorney]?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.  
***
THE COURT: Have you been satisfied with his explanation of why he has
recommended that you agree to it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
App. at 52.  The Court then correctly calculated the Guidelines range resulting from a
offense level of twenty-nine and a criminal history category of VI to be 151 to 188 months
  Smith’s sentence was calculated pursuant to the May 1,2
2007, edition of the Sentencing Guidelines.
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incarceration.   The District Court also addressed 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, concluding2
that a substantial sentence was warranted here due to the scale of the conspiracy, its
numerous victims, the need for specific and general deterrence, and the danger that Smith
posed to society as a result of his “lifetime of continued criminal activity.”  App. at 102.
Despite Smith’s agreement to waive his right to appeal his sentence, he now argues
that his sentence is unreasonable.
II.
 “‘Waivers of appeals, if entered knowingly and voluntarily, are valid, unless they
work a miscarriage of justice.’”  United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 205 (3d Cir.
2007) (quoting United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001).  Smith does not
argue that his plea was not knowing and voluntary.  Moreover, the record shows that
Smith discussed the plea agreement and its ramifications with both his attorney and the
District Court, and nothing in the record otherwise impugns the validity of the plea
agreement.
In addition, there is no question that Smith’s appeal falls within the scope of the
waiver provision, see United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 244 (3d Cir. 2008), because
Smith waived the right to “file any appeal . . . which challenges the sentence imposed by
the sentencing court if that sentence falls within or below the Guidelines range that results
  The District Court rejected Smith’s request for a waiver3
because of the conditions in the Passaic County Jail.  Even if that
objection were to survive the waiver, we would not disagree with
the District Court’s disposition.
5
from the agreed total Guidelines offense level of 29.”  App. at 32.  Even though Smith
reserved the right to appeal the District Court’s determination of his criminal history
category, the waiver also provided that he could not appeal any issue upon which the Court
accepted a stipulation between the parties.  Because the Court accepted the parties’
stipulation that Smith had a criminal history category of VI, he is precluded from
challenging that determination on appeal.
Finally, Smith’s case does not present “an unusual circumstance where an error
amounting to a miscarriage of justice may invalidate the waiver.”  Khattak, 273 F.3d at
562 (citing United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2001)).  Smith challenges
only the reasonableness of his sentence.  “[I]n light of Gall’s [Gall v. United States, 128
S.Ct. 586, 596 (2007)] deferential abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing sentencing
appeals, it will be a rare and unusual situation when claims of an unreasonable sentence,
standing alone, will be sufficient to invalidate a waiver because of a miscarriage of
justice.”  Jackson, 523 F.3d at 244.  This case clearly does not present any such “unusual
situation.”  Id.3
III.
Because Smith’s appeal is barred by the appellate waiver provision of his plea
agreement, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
